This paper is an attempt to shed some empirical light on image linkages that exist between a collective umbrella brand and its related individual components. To tackle this issue, we estimate an interaction model in which a single collective reputation both determines and is determined by a series of individual reputations à la Tirole (1996) .
Introduction
This paper is an attempt to shed some empirical light on image linkages that exist between a collective umbrella brand and its related individual components. This question is of importance given the major role played by reputation in daily life as recognized at least since von Hayek (1948, ch .V, p.97) and Marshall (1949, vol.4, xi) 1 but also in professional life. Indeed, a good reputation attracts clients, and often leads to higher prices through price premia for high quality products 2 (Shapiro, 1983) . Reputation is also viewed as a mechanism to provide incentives for agents to exert greater ef- either by colluding with other oligopolists in price setting, providing a high quality good or by deterring other firms from entering (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1989) . Under some conditions, reputation concerns might also cause agents to self-select into different groups, and explain how multiple groups with different characteristics and behavioral standards can co-exist in equilibrium (Levin, 2001 ). For Tirole (1996) "Our welfare and our incentives depend not only on our own reputation but also on that of the groups we are associated with", (p.18). The impact of both types of reputation (individual and collective) on prices has been the focus of several applications in wine economics in recent years (e.g. Landon and Smith, 1997) .
In this paper we estimate the impact of the reputation of a group on the reputation of its members. In other words, we question the existence of a collective reputation premium, a non-monetary reward that derives from the group we are associated with,a sort of collective spillover effect that would result in a positive impact on the level of individual reputation.
From an application to a sample of Bordeaux wines, we show that the magnitude of this reputation premium varies positively with the individual reputation level. In this specific context, the most reputed wine appellations are those that enjoy the highest reputation returns from the Bordeaux umbrella.
This result is in line with the theoretical predictions by Damiano et al.
(2010)who showed the existence of a pecking order effect, according to which higher ranks within organizations are rewarded with more resources (promotions for instance, corner offices, etc.). We highlight such a pecking order effect in terms of image benefits, and in the context of a highly-reputed organization with a rate of 50% of favorable opinions among consumers.
To tackle this issue we estimate an interaction model in which a single collective reputation both determines and is determined by a series of individual reputations à la Tirole (1996) . The data that we use in this application are detailed survey data concerning quality opinions on different The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature briefly, Section 3 sets out the empirical model, Section 4 presents the data, Section 5 describes the empirical strategy and the results, and Section 6 draws some conclusions.
2 Related Literature
Theoretical Literature
This paper is an attempt at testing part of Tirole's (1996) collective reputation theory. In his seminal paper, Tirole models "the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations" considering that "a group's reputation is only as good as that of its members" (p.1). He also assumes that "belonging to a group generates a rent but is no longer a fait accompli"(p. 15) and more precisely that belonging to a higher reputation group generates higher rents.
In the umbrella branding literature, collective reputation effects are analysed from the point of view of the multi-product firm. This literature is also concerned with a more specific issue: brand extension, i.e. the use of an established brand name to launch a product in a new market in order to reduce introductory costs (see Tauber, 1988) . A collective brand or name may also act as a quality signal through spillovers which create reputation linkages among various products or individuals (Choi et al., 1995) . In this context, individual incentives are associated with those of the group, which provides a strong commitment to maintain a high quality level for each product. Winfree and McCluskey (2005) explore, both theoretically and empirically, a market situation where several producers of a differentiated product (apples) are con-cerned with a single collective name at the regional level (Washington State).
In such a context, where a single name is used by several producers, the collective reputation becomes a public good (non-excludable, non-rivalry) and the incentives to provide quality decrease as the size of the group increases (free riding on quality). Indeed it is impossible to exclude a producer from the benefits of the umbrella and there is non-rivalry in the sense that the use of the collective name from one producer does not prevent another one from using the same name at the same time.
The possibility for consumers to identify a range of products with the firm can provide substantial economies of scope and higher profits in equilibrium.
Andersson (2002) shows that the profits made by a firm carrying a pooled reputation for producing two goods of high quality are "not smaller" than the sum of the profits of two separate firms where each one is producing a high quality good and carrying its own individual reputation 3 . For Wernerfelt (1988, p.459), by branding a new product, the firm does two things:
it claims that both the old and the new product are of good quality, and it invites consumers to pool their experience with the two products to infer both qualities. Brand extension is efficient only when all the products under the umbrella are of good quality and therefore contribute to the umbrella's reputation. This implies that, in equilibrium, only firms producing good quality actually choose to use the umbrella branding strategy. Cabral (2000) gets similar results using somewhat different assumptions 4 . In particular, he
shows that it is in the interest of firms producing a lower quality product to create a new name or reputation for the new product instead of stretching their initial reputation.
Brand extension practices, and more generally bundling a product of established quality together with one of unknown quality, can also be seen as a mechanism for informational leverage, where a firm leverages off a good's reputation in one market to mitigate the problem of informational asymmetry encountered in other markets (Choi, 1998 (Choi, , 2003 (Choi, , 2007 .
According to Damanio et al. (2010) , agents are usually faced with a trade-off between the peer effect and the pecking order effect when they have to decide which group to join. According to the peer effect, people desire to join organizations with high-quality members because it raises their own utility or productivity. The pecking order effect implies that they can also get advantages from their relative position or ranking in a given organization, especially when they are high up in the pecking order. The latter effect arises when resources -and presumably collective reputation impactsare distributed among the members according to their rank 5 .
Empirical Literature
Empirically, the notion of collective reputation has received less attention.
Erdem (1998) finds that for oral-hygiene products "consumers expect the quality levels of products that are umbrella branded to be correlated highly". Sullivan (1990) provides empirical evidence for the existence of positive and negative image spillovers between the demand for products sold under the same brand name in the case of automobiles. Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) assess the effect of a product recall on the demand for this product and also on the demand for its substitutes in the case of drugs and cars. The responsible producer bears losses that are greater than the strict recall costs because of a loss of goodwill, and those losses spill over to competitors. Because of a negative externality, any favorable effect of a recall on the demand for substitutes is swamped by a more general negative effect on the industry.
Borenstein and Zimmerman (1988) find that demand losses resulting from a specific airline crash affect the airline concerned as well as the main competing airlines.
In a seminal application to Bordeaux wines, Smith (1997, 1998) show that both individual and collective reputations account for a substantial fraction of price variations observed for this product. Here, the collective reputation refers to the appellation name and individual reputa- Here, collective reputation refers to two distinct consortia of wine estates (Verband Deutscher Prädikatsweingüter and Bernkasteler Ring) and not to regional or sub-regional names as in the case of Bordeaux wines analysed by Smith (1997, 1998 ).
Empirical Model
The empirical model discussed in this section is based on the notion of perceived quality as defined earlier by Zeithaml (1988, p.3) . While objective quality can be defined as superiority or excellence, perceived quality can be viewed as the consumer's judgment about a product's overall excellence or superiority. At the aggregate level, this notion of perceived quality clearly refers to that of reputation (Shapiro, 1983 ).
Letting h index individual survey respondents, i = 1, ..., n index the appellations, g denote the group (Bordeaux), the model is:
...
) is the quality of the group (resp. sub-appellation i)
as perceived by h, X Respondents are 46 years old on average and 51% of them are women. 
Estimation procedure and Results
As mentioned above, this dataset does not contain enough instrumental variables to identify each individual reputation (q h i ) which would be required if we were to provide unbiased estimates for every γ i parameter. Hopefully, it holds valid instruments for q h g , the group's quality as perceived by the 6,394 respondents. Therefore, we restrict the econometric analysis to the evaluation of the different umbrella impacts (δ 0 i s).
Two-Stage Least Squares
First we estimate a series of recursive models with the following structure using the 2SLS estimation procedure 8 :
In this setup, q h g is regressed in the collective reputation equation (0) against X h g and the instruments Z Table 2 along with those of a battery of tests for the endogeneity of q h g , the validity or weakness of the instruments (Hansen's J, Stock and Yogo) in Table 3 . Whenever necessary we tested the exogeneity of one or more questionable instruments using the "Differencein-Sargan" statistic also known as the C-Statistic. Figure 2 summarizes the results of the 2SLS procedure which does not allow us to control for the fact that the quality variables are of the binary type.
[Insert Table 2 [Insert Table 3 around here]
The instruments Z h g turned out to be reasonable predictors of what people think about Bordeaux as a generic appellation. Among these, Beaujolais and Languedoc-Roussillon turned out to be the most predictive (significant). 9 The highest relative bias that we get (20-30%) concerns only one regression (Côtes-de-Bourg) in which q h g were not found endogenous. In the other regressions, the relative bias potentially induced by the weakness of the instruments is quite acceptable (between 10% and 20% in two regressions and lower than 10% in the others). The results of the various Hansen's overidentification tests failed to reject the hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous in every regression.
Robustness check
As a robustness check, we ran a second series of regressions using a Recursive Bivariate Probit (RBP) procedure which is more appropriate given that both q h i and q h g are of the binary type. The RBP results (Table 4) are then compared to those obtained after a regular ML probit estimation procedure (Table 5) Umbrella Impacts Entre-deux-Mers, the two less well reputed appellations (7.57% and 7.65% respectively). Not controlling for this endogeneity pitfall results in a downward bias in the estimated returns to collective reputation. From Figure 3 we observe that ML We get positive and significant spillover effects from the umbrella reputation for 8 individual appellations out of 9. Highly-reputed appellations are found to enjoy larger umbrella impacts than less-reputed appellations.
These image spillover effects when positive vary from a minimum of 5% to a maximum of 15% of additional favorable quality opinions (see Figure 4 which reproduces on the vertical axis the marginal effects in percentage points for the RBP estimates 10 ).
In this group, only the leaders take a significant advantage from the high level of reputation of Bordeaux. For the followers, there is no advantage in being part of this group as they are not clearly associated to Bordeaux in the consumer's mind. This is particularly true for Entre-deux-Mers and Côtes de Bourg which do not enjoy the slightest image benefit from the fact that they are naturally Bordeaux wines. This drawback could certainly be mitigated through some specific advertising which should consists of strengthening the link between these appellations and Bordeaux in order to make it more obvious in the mind of the consumer.
Conclusion
In this paper we measured the influence of Bordeaux as a brand on a series of 9 appellations beneath this umbrella. Controlling for the fact that both types of reputation are released simultaneously, we get significant positive spillover effects from the umbrella, the magnitude of which depends positively on the individual reputation level of the wine under the umbrella. The reputation of this prestigious wine appellation would thus also act as a positive quality signal among a significant fraction of surveyed people in Western Europe.
Essentially, due to a lack of appropriate data and available valid instruments, in most studies brand reputation is often treated as exogenous. This paper shows that not controlling for the natural endogeneity of this variable in a simultaneous setup such as this generates downward biased estimates of those spillover effects which derive from the group's reputation.
This application is based instead on an appropriate IV estimation procedure (Recursive Bivariate Probit) which guarantees unbiased estimates of the effect of Bordeaux over the image of its main related wines. Given the difficulty in identifying each individual reputation with appropriate instruments, we focused the analysis and restricted it to measuring the effect of Bordeaux's reputation on that of its major components.
Consumers' opinions about the quality of some other famous wines produced in France (Alsace, Beaujolais, Burgundy, Côtes du Rhône, LanguedocRoussillon, Loire) have been used as instruments in order to identify the reputation of Bordeaux. These instruments proved to be valid in the sense that they are reasonably connected to Bordeaux (not weak) and not statistically related to its 9 components (exogenous).
This result is achieved in a specific environment, with a powerful umbrella which is at least twice as well reputed as its best reputed entities. The result could have been different had the umbrella been less influential.
Further research is clearly required to confirm these results by applying this methodology to other goods, services or individuals, although wines do seem to offer an appropriate field of application, given the presence of valid instruments as suggested in this article. information about these wines in the dataset. 7 In this survey wine consumers drink wine at least once a quarter. 8 For simplicity, we assume that there is no image spillovers between the different individual reputations. 9 The results for the first step equations are available from the authors upon request. 10 These effects were computed using Tamás Bartus' Margeff package for 
